Not sure how much you’ll like this answer, but I don’t think we should think of the science of dialectical materialism (or a science of history) as making predictions about discreet phenomena in the same way that, say, physics might predict that a ball of such-and-such weight will roll down a ramp of such-and-such angle at a particular speed. That, as it were, is the science that pertains to inert matter; it is a one-sided affair entirely concerned with the objective part of the world. Which is not to diminish its value in the least, but to draw the boundaries thereof.
A science of history, by contrast, is a science not just of matter, but of people and processes in which people are actors. It is, in other words, a social science that puts the subjective and objective elements in dialectical relationship to one another.
As such, it doesn’t describe iron laws of motion (or whatever), but tendencies of development and interaction that may or may not hold depending on how that dialectic plays out. In that respect, it should be seen in the same light as other social sciences. Just as it would be strange to say that “the predictions of sociology have been falsified” (what predictions? The subject of sociology isn’t in the business of making predictions!), so the same goes for dialectical materialism.
I often think of Aristotle’s advice that we should apply the methods most appropriate to the subject matter being studied, and when we consider the subject matter of people and the things they do, I think the best we get is Marx’s picture (or something close to it).
In that respect, I think it’s SUPER important to study marx (and his disciples)
Given the theory was falsified, in terms of prediction making, how seriously do you think we should take Marx and, by extension, his disciples?
Not sure how much you’ll like this answer, but I don’t think we should think of the science of dialectical materialism (or a science of history) as making predictions about discreet phenomena in the same way that, say, physics might predict that a ball of such-and-such weight will roll down a ramp of such-and-such angle at a particular speed. That, as it were, is the science that pertains to inert matter; it is a one-sided affair entirely concerned with the objective part of the world. Which is not to diminish its value in the least, but to draw the boundaries thereof.
A science of history, by contrast, is a science not just of matter, but of people and processes in which people are actors. It is, in other words, a social science that puts the subjective and objective elements in dialectical relationship to one another.
As such, it doesn’t describe iron laws of motion (or whatever), but tendencies of development and interaction that may or may not hold depending on how that dialectic plays out. In that respect, it should be seen in the same light as other social sciences. Just as it would be strange to say that “the predictions of sociology have been falsified” (what predictions? The subject of sociology isn’t in the business of making predictions!), so the same goes for dialectical materialism.
I often think of Aristotle’s advice that we should apply the methods most appropriate to the subject matter being studied, and when we consider the subject matter of people and the things they do, I think the best we get is Marx’s picture (or something close to it).
In that respect, I think it’s SUPER important to study marx (and his disciples)